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Abstract
CNNs are poised to become integral parts of many criti-
cal systems. Despite their robustness to natural variations,
image pixel values can be manipulated, via small, carefully
crafted, imperceptible perturbations, to cause a model to
misclassify images. We present an algorithm to process an
image so that classification accuracy is significantly pre-
served in the presence of such adversarial manipulations.
Image classifiers tend to be robust to natural noise, and
adversarial attacks tend to be agnostic to object location.
These observations motivate our strategy, which leverages
model robustness to defend against adversarial perturba-
tions by forcing the image to match natural image statistics.
Our algorithm locally corrupts the image by redistributing
pixel values via a process we term pixel deflection. A subse-
quent wavelet-based denoising operation softens this cor-
ruption, as well as some of the adversarial changes. We
demonstrate experimentally that the combination of these
techniques enables the effective recovery of the true class,
against a variety of robust attacks. Our results compare
favorably with current state-of-the-art defenses, without re-
quiring retraining or modifying the CNN.
Code: github.com/iamaaditya/pixel-deflection
1. Introduction
Image classification convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) have become a part of many critical real-world sys-
tems. For example, CNNs can be used by banks to read
the dollar amount of a check [4], or by self-driving cars to
identify stop signs [37].
The critical nature of these systems makes them targets
for adversarial attacks. Recent work has shown that clas-
sifiers can be tricked by small, carefully-crafted, impercep-
tible perturbations to a natural image. These perturbations
can cause a CNN to misclassify an image into a different
class (e.g. a “1” into a “9” or a stop sign into a yield sign).
Thus, defending against these vulnerabilities will be crit-
ical to the further adoption of advanced computer vision
systems. Here, we consider white-box attacks, in which an
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Figure 1: Impact of Pixel Deflection on a natural image and
subsequent denoising using wavelet transform. Left: Im-
age with given number of pixels deflected. Middle: Dif-
ference between clean image and deflected image. Right:
Difference between clean image and deflected image after
denoising. Enlarge to see details.
adversary can see the weights of the classification model.
Most of these attacks work by taking advantage of the dif-
ferentiable nature of the classification model, i.e. taking the
gradient of the output class probabilities with respect to a
particular pixel. Several previous works propose defense
mechanisms that are differentiable transformations applied
to an image before classification. These differentiable de-
fenses appear to work well at first, but attackers can eas-
ily circumvent these defenses by “differentiating through
them”, i.e. by taking the gradient of a class probability with
respect to an input pixel through both the CNN and the
transformation.
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In this work, we present a defense method which com-
bines two novel techniques for defending against adversar-
ial attacks, which together modify input images in such a
way that is (1) non-differentiable, and (2) frequently re-
stores the original classification. The first component, pixel
deflection, takes advantage of a CNN’s resistance to the
noise that occurs in natural images by randomly replac-
ing some pixels with randomly selected pixels from a small
neighborhood. We show how to weight the initial random
pixel selection using a robust activation map. The second
approach, adaptive soft-thresholding in the wavelet domain,
which has been shown to effectively capture the distribu-
tion of natural images. This thresholding process smooths
adversarially-perturbed images in such a way so as to re-
duce the effects of the attacks.
Experimentally, we show that the combination of these
approaches can effectively defend against state-of-the-art
attacks [44, 18, 6, 32, 36, 24] Additionally, we show that
these transformations do not significantly decrease the clas-
sifier’s accuracy on non-adversarial images.
In Section 2, we discuss the various attack techniques
against which we will test our defense. In Sections 3 and 4
we discuss the established defense techniques against which
we will compare our technique. In Sections 5, 6 and 7 we
lay out the components of our defense and provide the intu-
ition behind them. In Sections 9 and 10, we provide experi-
mental results on a subset of ImageNet.
2. Adversarial Attacks
It has been established that most image classification
models can easily be fooled [44, 18]. Several techniques
have been proposed which can generate an image that is per-
ceptually indistinguishable from another image but is clas-
sified differently. This can be done robustly when model
parameters are known, a paradigm called white-box at-
tacks [18, 24, 28, 6]. In the scenario where access to the
model is not available, called black-box attacks, a secondary
model can be trained using the model to be attacked as a
guide. It has been shown that the adversarial examples gen-
erated using these substitute models are transferable to the
original classifiers [37, 26].
Consider a given image x and a classifier Fθ(·) with pa-
rameters θ. Then an adversarial example for Fθ(·) is an
image xˆ which is close to x (i.e. ||x − xˆ|| is small, where
the norm used differs between attacks), but the classifier’s
prediction for each of them is different, i.e. F (x) 6= F (xˆ).
Untargeted attacks are methods to produce such an image,
given x and Fθ(·). Targeted attacks, however, seek a xˆ such
that F (xˆ) = yˆ for some specific choice of yˆ 6= F (x), i.e.
targeted attacks try to induce a specific class label, whereas
untargeted attacks simply try to destroy the original class
label.
Next, we present a brief overview of several well-known
attacks, which form the basis for our experiments.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [18] is a single
step attack process. It uses the sign of the gradient of the
loss function, `, w.r.t. to the image to find the adversarial
perturbation. For a given value , FGSM is defined as:
xˆ = x+ sign(∇`(F (x), x)) (1)
Iterative Gradient Sign Method (IGSM) [24] is an iter-
ative version of FGSM. After each iteration the generated
image is clipped to be within a L∞ neighborhood of the
original and this process stops when an adversarial image
has been discovered. Both FGSM and IGSM minimize the
L∞ norm w.r.t. to the original image. Let x′0 = x, then after
m iterations, the adversarial image is obtained by:
x′m+1 = Clipx,
{
x′m + α× sign(∇`(F (x′m), x′m))
}
(2)
L-BFGS [44] tries to find the adversarial input as a box-
constraint minimization problem. L-BFGS optimization is
used to minimize L2 distance between the image and the
adversarial example while keeping a constraint on the class
label for the generated image.
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [36] es-
timates the saliency of each image pixel w.r.t. to the clas-
sification output, and modifies those pixels which are most
salient. This is a targeted attack, and saliency is designed to
find the pixel which increases the classifier’s output for the
target class while tending to decrease the output for other
classes.
Deep Fool (DFool) [32] is an untargeted iterative attack.
This method approximates the classifier as a linear decision
boundary and then finds the smallest perturbation needed to
cross that boundary. This attack minimizes L2 norm w.r.t.
to the original image.
Carlini & Wagner (C&W) [6] is a recently proposed ad-
versarial attack, and one of the strongest. C&W updates the
loss function, such that it jointly minimizes Lp and a cus-
tom differentiable loss function that uses the unnormalized
outputs of the classifier (logits). Let Zk denote the logits of
a model for a given class k, and κ a margin parameter. Then
C&W tries to minimize:
||x− xˆ||p + c ∗max (Z(xˆy)−max{Z(xˆ)k : k 6= y},−κ)
(3)
For our experiments, we use L2 for the first term, as this
makes the entire loss function differentiable and therefore
easier to train. Limited success has been observed with L0
and L∞ for images beyond CIFAR and MNIST.
We have not included recently proposed attacks like
‘Projected Gradient Descent’ [28] and ‘One Pixel At-
tack’ [43] because although they have been shown to be ro-
bust on datasets of small images like CIFAR10 and MNIST,
they do not scale well to large images. Our method is tar-
geted towards large natural images where object localiza-
tion is meaningful, i.e. that there are many pixels outside
the region of the image where the object is located.
3. Defenses
Given a classification model F and an image x˜, which
may either be an original image x, or an adversarial image
xˆ, the goal of a defense method is to either augment either
F as F ′ such that F ′(x˜) = F (x), or transform x˜ by a trans-
formation T such that F (T (x˜)) = F (x).
One method for augmenting F is called Ensemble Ad-
versarial training [46], which augments the training of deep
convolutional networks to include various potential adver-
sarial perturbations. This expands the decision boundaries
around training examples to include some nearby adversar-
ial examples, thereby making the task of finding an adver-
sary within a certain  harder than conventional models. An-
other popular technique uses distillation from a larger net-
work by learning to match the softmax [38]. This provides
smoother decision boundaries and thus makes is harder to
find an adversarial example which is imperceptible. There
are methods that proposes to detect the adversarial images
as it passes through the classifier model [31, 2].
Most transformation-based defense strategies suffer
from accuracy loss with clean images [14, 24], i.e. they pro-
duce F (T (x)) 6= F (x). This is an undesirable side effect
of the transformation process, and we propose a transforma-
tion which tries to minimize this loss while also recovering
the classification of an adversarial image. Detailed discus-
sion on various kinds of transformation based defenses is
provided in section 4.
4. Related Work
Transformation-based defenses are a relatively recent
and unexplored development in adversarial defense. The
biggest obstacle facing most transformation-based defenses
is that the transformation degrades the quality of non-
adversarial images, leading to a loss of accuracy. This has
limited the success of transformations as a practical de-
fense, as even those which are effective at removing ad-
versarial transformations struggle to maintain the model’s
accuracy on clean images. Our work is most similar to
Guo et al.’s [19] recently proposed transformation of im-
age by quilting and Total Variance Minimization (TVM).
Image quilting is performed by replacing patches of the in-
put image with similar patches drawn from a bank of im-
ages. They collect one million image patches from clean
images and use a k-nearest neighbor algorithm to find the
best match. Image quilting in itself does not yield satisfac-
tory results, so it is augmented with TVM. In Total Vari-
ance Minimization, a substitute image is constructed by op-
timization such that total variance is minimized. Total vari-
ation minimization has been widely used [17] as an image
denoising technique. Our method uses semantic maps to
obtain a better pixel to update and our update mechanism
does not require any optimization and thus is significantly
faster.
Another closely related work is from Luo et al. [27].
They propose a foveation-based mechanism. Using ground-
truth data about object coordinates, they crop the image
around the object, and then scale it back to the original size.
Our model shares the hypothesis that not all regions of
the image are equally important to a classifier. Further,
foveation-based methods can be fooled by finding an ad-
versarial perturbation within the object bounding box. Our
model does not rely on a ground-truth bounding box, and
the stochastic nature of our approach means that it is not
restricted to only modifying a particular region of the input.
Yet another similar work is from Xie et al. [48], in which
they pad the image and take multiple random crops and
evaluate ensemble classification. This method utilizes the
randomness property that our model also exploits. How-
ever, our model tries to spatially define the probability of a
presence of a perturbation and subsequently uses wavelet-
based transform to denoise the perturbations.
5. Pixel Deflection
Much has been written about the lack of robustness of
deep convolutional networks in the presence of adversarial
inputs [33, 45]. However, most deep classifiers are robust to
the presence of natural noise, such as sensor noise [11]. We
Algorithm 1: Pixel deflection transform
Input : Image I , neighborhood size r
Output: Image I ′ of the same dimensions as I
1 for i← 0 to K do
2 Let pi ∼ U(I)
3 Let ni ∼ U(Rrp ∩ I)
4 I ′[pi] = I[ni]
5 end
introduce a form of artificial noise and show that most mod-
els are similarly robust to this noise. We randomly sample a
pixel from an image, and replace it with another randomly
selected pixel from within a small square neighborhood. We
also experimented with other neighborhood types, includ-
ing sampling from a Gaussian centered on the pixel, but
these alternatives were less effective.
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Figure 2: Average classification probabilities for an adver-
sarial image (top) and clean image (bottom) after pixel de-
flection (Image size: 299x299)
We term this process pixel deflection, and give a formal
definition in Algorithm 1. LetRrp be a square neighborhood
with apothem r centered at a pixel p. Let U(R) be the uni-
form distribution over all pixels within R. Let Ip indicate
the value of pixel p in image I .
As shown in Figure 2, even changing as much as 1%
(i.e. 10 times the amount changed in our experiments) of
the original pixels does not alter the classification of a clean
image. However, application of pixel deflection enables the
recovery of a significant portion of correct classifications.
5.1. Distribution of Attacks
Most attacks search the entire image plane for adversar-
ial perturbations, without regard for the location of the im-
age content. This is in contrast with the classification mod-
els, which show high activation in regions where an object is
present [50, 8]. This is especially true for attacks which aim
to minimize the Lp norm of their changes for large values
of p, as this gives little to no constraint on the total number
of pixels perturbed. In fact, Lou et al. [27] use the object
coordinates to mask out the background region and show
that this defends against some of the known attacks.
In Figure 3 we show the average spatial distribution of
perturbations for several attacks, as compared to the distri-
bution of object locations (top left). Based on these ideas,
we explore the possibility of updating the pixels in the im-
age such that the probability of that pixel being updated is
inversely proportional to the likelihood of that pixel con-
taining an object.
Figure 3: Visualization showing average location in the im-
age where perturbation is added by an attacker. Clockwise
from top left: Localization of most salient object in the im-
age, FGSM, IGSM, FGSM-2 (higher ), Deep Fool, JSMA,
LBFGS and Carlini-Wagner attack.
6. Targeted Pixel Deflection
As we have shown in section 5, image classification is
robust against the loss of a certain number of pixels.
In natural images, many pixels do not correspond to a
relevant semantic object and are therefore not salient to clas-
sification. Classifiers should then be more robust to pixel
deflection if more pixels corresponding to the background
are dropped as compared to the salient objects. Luo et al.
[27] used this idea to mask the regions which did not con-
tain the object, however, their method has two limitations
which we will seek to overcome.
First, it requires ground-truth object coordinates and it
is, therefore, difficult to apply to unlabeled inputs at infer-
ence time. We solve this by using a variant of class activa-
tion maps to obtain an approximate localization for salient
objects. Class activation maps [51] are a weakly-supervised
localization [35] technique in which the last layer of a CNN,
often a fully connected layer, is replaced with a global av-
erage pooling layer. This results in a heat map which lacks
pixel-level precision but is able to approximately localize
objects by their class. We prefer to use weakly supervised
localization over saliency maps [21], as saliency maps are
trained on human eye fixations and thus do not always cap-
ture object classes [30]. Other weakly supervised local-
ization techniques, such as regions-of-interest [39], capture
more than a single object and thus are not suitable for im-
proving single-class classification.
Second, completely masking out the background dete-
riorates classification of classes for which the model has
come to rely on the co-occurrence of non-class objects.
For instance, airplanes are often accompanied by a sky-
colored background, and most classifiers will have lower
confidence when trying to classify an airplane outside of
this context. We take a Bayesian approach to this problem
and use stochastic re-sampling of the background. This pre-
CAM on clean Image
Top Class: Warplane (0.91)
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Figure 4: Difference between standard activation maps and
robust maps under the presence of an adversary.
serves enough of the background to protect classification
and drops enough pixels to weaken the impact of adversar-
ial input.
6.1. Robust Activation Map
Class activation maps [51] are a valuable tool for ap-
proximate semantic object localization. Consider a convo-
lutional network with k output channels on the final con-
volution layer (f ) with spatial dimensions of x and y, and
let w be a vector of size k which is the result of applying a
global max pool on each channel. This reduces channel to a
single value, wk. The class activation map, Mc for a class
c is given by:
Mc(x, y) =
∑
k
wck fk(x, y) (4)
Generally, one is interested in the map for the class for
which the model assigns the highest probability. However,
in the presence of adversarial perturbations to the input, the
highest-probability class is likely to be incorrect. Fortu-
nately, our experiments show that an adversary which suc-
cessfully changes the most likely class tends to leave the rest
of the top-k classes unchanged. Our experiments show that
38% of the time the predicted class of adversarial images is
the second highest class of the model for the clean image.
Figure 6 shows how the class of adversarial image relates
to predictions on clean images. ImageNet has one thou-
sand classes, many of which are fine-grained. Frequently,
the second most likely class is a synonym or close relative
of the main class (e.g. “Indian Elephant” and “African Ele-
phant”). To obtain a map which is robust to fluctuations
of the most likely class, we take an exponentially weighted
average of the maps of the top-k classes.
M̂(x, y) =
k∑
i
Mci(x, y)
2i
(5)
We normalize the map by diving it by its max so that values
are in the range of [0, 1]. Even if the top-1 class is incorrect,
this averaging reduces the impact of mis-localization of the
object in the image.
The appropriate number of classes k to average over de-
pends on the total number of classes. For ImageNet-1000,
we used a fixed k = 5. While each possible class has its
own class activation map (CAM), only a single robust acti-
vation map is generated for a particular image, combining
information about all classes. ImageNet covers wide variety
of object classes and most structures found in other datasets
are represented in ImageNet even if class names are not bi-
jectional. Therefore, Robust Activation Map (R-CAM) is
trained once on ImageNet but can also localize objects from
Pascal-VOC or Traffic Signs.
7. Wavelet Denoising
Because both pixel deflection and adversarial attacks add
noise to the image, it is desirable to apply a denoising trans-
form to lessen these effects. Since adversarial attacks do
not take into account the frequency content of the perturbed
image, they are likely to pull the input away from the class
of likely natural images in a way which can be detected and
corrected using a multi-resolution analysis.
Works such as [7, 42, 16] have shown that natural im-
ages exhibit regularities in their wavelet responses which
can be learned from data and used to denoise images. These
regularities can also be exploited to achieve better lossy im-
age compression, the basis of JPEG2000. Many vision and
neuroscience researchers [29, 41, 22] have suggested that
the visual systems of many animals take advantage of these
priors, as the simple cells in the primary visual cortex have
been shown to have Gabor-like receptive fields.
Swapping pixels within a window will tend to add noise
with unlikely frequency content to the image, particularly
if the window is large. This kind of noise can be removed
by image compression techniques like JPEG, however, the
quantization process in JPEG uses fixed tables that are ag-
nostic to image content, and it quantizes responses at all am-
plitudes while the important image features generally cor-
respond to large frequency responses. This quantization re-
duces noise but also gets rid of some of the signal.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that JPEG compression re-
covers correct classification on some of the adversarial im-
ages but also reduces the classification accuracy on clean
images [24, 9, 14, 19]. Dziugaite et al. [14] reported loss of
8% accuracy on clean images after undergoing JPEG com-
pression.
We, therefore, seek filters with frequency response bet-
ter suited to joint space-frequency analysis than the DCT
blocks (and more closely matching representations in the
early ventral stream, so that features which have a small
filter response are less perceptible) and quantization tech-
niques more suited to denoising. Wavelet denoising uses
wavelet coefficients obtained using Discrete Wavelet Trans-
form [3]. The wavelet transform represents the signal
as a linear combination of orthonormal wavelets. These
wavelets form a basis for the space of images and are sepa-
rated in space, orientation, and scale. The Discrete Wavelet
Transform is widely used in image compression [1] and im-
age denoising [7, 40, 42].
While the noise introduced by dropping a pixel is mostly
high-frequency, the same cannot be said about the adversar-
ial perturbations. Several attempts have been made to quan-
tify distribution of adversarial perturbations [15, 25] but re-
cent work by Carlini and Wagner [5] has shown that most
techniques fail to detect adversarial examples. We have ob-
served that for the perturbations added by well-known at-
tacks, wavelet denoising yields superior results as compared
to block DCT.
7.1. Hard & Soft Thresholding
The process of performing a wavelet transform and its
inverse is lossless and thus does not provide any noise re-
duction. In order to reduce adversarial noise, we need to
apply thresholding to the wavelet coefficients before in-
verting the transform. Most compression techniques use
a hard thresholding process, in which all coefficients with
magnitude below the threshold are set to zero: Q(Xˆ) =
Xˆ ∀ |Xˆ| > Th, where Xˆ is the wavelet transform of
X , and Th is the threshold value. The alternative is soft
thresholding, in which we additionally subtract the thresh-
old from the magnitude of coefficients above the threshold:
Q(Xˆ) = sign(Xˆ) × max(0, |Xˆ| − Th). Jansen et al. [23]
observed that hard thresholding results in over-blurring of
the input image, while soft thresholding maintains better
PSNR. By reducing all coefficients, rather than just those
below the threshold, soft thresholding avoids introducing
extraneous noise. This allows our method to preserve clas-
sification accuracy on non-adversarial images.
7.2. Adaptive Thresholding
Determining the proper threshold is very important, and
the efficacy of our method relies on the ability to pick a
threshold in an adaptive, image specific manner. The stan-
dard technique for determining the threshold for wavelet de-
noising is to use a universal threshold formula called Vi-
suShrink. For an image X with N pixels, this is given
by σ
√
2 logN , where σ is the variance of the noise to
be removed and is a hyper-parameter. However, we used
BayesShrink [7], which models the threshold for each
wavelet coefficient as a Generalized Gaussian Distribution
(GGD). The optimal threshold is then assumed to be the
value which minimizes the expected mean square error i.e.
Th ∗ (σx, β) = argmin
Th
E(Xˆ −X)2 ≈ σ
2
σx
(6)
where σx and β are parameters of the GGD for each wavelet
sub-band. In practice, an approximation, as shown on right
side of equation 6, is used. This ratio, also called TBayes,
adapts to the amount of noise in the given image. Within
a certain range of β values, BayesShrink has been shown
to effectively remove artificial noise while preserving the
perceptual features of natural images [7, 40]. As our exper-
iments are carried out with images from ImageNet, which
is a collection of natural images, we believe this is an ap-
propriate thresholding technique to use. Yet another popu-
lar thresholding technique is Stein’s Unbiased Risk Estima-
tor (SUREShrink), which computes unbiased estimate of
E(Xˆ − X)2. SUREShrink requires optimization to learn
Th for a given coefficient. We empirically evaluated results
and SUREShrink did not perform as well as BayesShrink.
Comparative results are shown in Table 6.
8. Method
The first step of our method is to corrupt the adversarial
noise by applying targeted pixel deflection as follows:
(a) Generate a robust activation map M̂ , as described in
section 6.1.
(b) Uniformly sample a pixel location (x, y) from the
image, and obtain the normalized activation map value for
that location, vx,y = M̂(x, y).
(c) Sample a random value from a uniform distribution
U(0, 1). If vx,y is lower than the random value, we deflect
the pixel using the algorithm shown in Algorithm 1.
(d) Iterate this process K times.
The following steps are used to soften the impact of pixel
deflection:
(a) Convert the image to Y CbCr space to decorrelate
the channels. Y CbCr space is perceptually meaningful and
thus has similar denoising advantages to the wavelets.
(b) Project the image into the wavelet domain using the
discrete wavelet transform. We use the db1 wavelet, but
similar results were obtained with db2 and haar wavelets.
(c) Soft threshold the wavelets using BayesShrink.
(d) Compute the inverse wavelet transform on the
shrunken wavelet coefficients.
(e) Convert the image back to RGB.
9. Experimental Design
We tested our method on 1000 randomly selected im-
ages from the ImageNet [10] Validation set. We use
ResNet-50 [20] as our classifier. We obtain the pre-trained
weights from TensorFlow’s GitHub repository. These mod-
els achieved a Top-1 accuracy of 76% on our selected im-
ages. This is in agreement with the accuracy numbers re-
ported in [20] for a single-model single-crop inference.
By the definition set by adversarial attacks, an attack
is considered successful by default if the original image
is already mis-classified. In this case, the adversary sim-
ply returns the original image unmodified. However, these
cases are not useful for measuring the effectiveness of an
attack or a defense as there is no pixel level difference be-
tween the images. As such, we restrict our experiments to
those images which are correctly classified in the absence
of adversarial noise. Our attack models are based on the
Cleverhans [34] library1 with model parameters that aim to
achieve the highest possible misclassification score with a
normalized RMSE (|L2|) budget of 0.02− 0.04.
We will publicly release our implementation code.
9.1. Training
Our defense model has three hyper-parameters, which is
significantly fewer than the classification models it seeks to
protect, making it preferable over defenses which require
retraining of the classifier such as [47, 31]. These three
hyper-parameters are: σ, a coefficient for BayesShrink, r,
the window size for pixel deflection, and K, the number of
pixel deflections to perform. Using a reduced set of 300
images from ImageNet Validation set, We perform a linear
search over a small range of these hyper-parameters. These
images are not part of the set used to show the results of our
model. A particular set of hyper-parameters may be optimal
for one attack model, but not for another. This is primarily
because attacks seek to minimize different Lp norms, and
therefore generate different types of noise. To demonstrate
the robustness of our defense, we select a single setting
of the hyper-parameters to be used against all attack mod-
els. Figure 5 shows a visual indication of the variations in
performance of each model across various hyper-parameter
settings. In general, as the K and r increase, the variance
of the resulting classification accuracy increases. This is
primarily due to the stochastic nature of pixel deflection -
as more deflections are performed over a wider window, a
greater variety of transformed images can result.
10. Results & Discussion
In Table 1 we present results obtained by applying
our transformation against various untargeted white-box at-
tacks. Our method is agnostic to classifier architecture, and
thus shows similar results across various classifiers. For
brevity, we report only results on ResNet-50. Results for
other classifiers are provided in Table 3. The accuracy
on clean images without any defense is 100% because we
didn’t test our defense on images which were misclassified
before any attack. We do not report results for targeted at-
tacks as they are harder to generate [6] and easier to defend.
Due to the stochastic nature of our model, we benefit from
taking the majority prediction over ten runs; this is reported
in Table 1 as Ens-10.
We randomly sampled 10K images from ILSVRC2012
validation set; this contained all 1000 classes with minimum
1https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
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Figure 5: Linear search for model parameters
Model |L2| No Defense With Defense
Single Ens-10
Clean 0.00 100 98.3 98.9
FGSM 0.05 20.0 79.9 81.5
IGSM 0.03 14.1 83.7 83.7
DFool 0.02 26.3 86.3 90.3
JSMA 0.02 25.5 91.5 97.0
LBFGS 0.02 12.1 88.0 91.6
C&W 0.04 04.8 92.7 98.0
Large perturbations
FGSM 0.12 11.1 61.5 70.4
IGSM 0.09 11.1 62.5 72.5
DFool 0.08 08.0 82.4 88.9
JSMA 0.05 22.1 88.9 92.1
LBFGS 0.04 12.1 77.0 89.0
Table 1: Params: σ = 0.04, Window=10, Deflections=100
Top-1 accuracy on applying pixel deflection and wavelet
denoising across various attack models. We evaluate non-
efficient attacks at larger |LP | which leave visible perturba-
tions to show the robustness of our model.
of 3 images per class.
10.1. Results on various classifiers
Original classification accuracy of each classifier on
selected 1000 images is reported in the table. However, we
omit the images that were originally incorrectly classified,
thus the accuracy of clean images without defense is
Attack |L2| No Defense With Defense
Window=10, Deflections=100 Single Ens-10
Clean 0.00 100 98.1 98.9
FGSM 0.04 19.2 79.7 81.2
IGSM 0.03 11.8 81.7 82.4
DFool 0.02 18.0 87.7 92.4
JSMA 0.02 24.9 93.0 98.1
LBFGS 0.02 11.6 90.3 93.6
C&W 0.04 05.2 93.1 98.3
Table 2: Top-1 accuracy of our model on various attack
models.
always 100%. Weights for each classifier were obtained
from Tensorflow GitHub repository 2.
Model |L2| No Defense With Defense
Single Ens-10
ResNet-50, original classification 76%
Clean 0.00 100 98.3 98.9
FGSM 0.05 20.0 79.9 81.5
IGSM 0.03 14.1 83.7 83.7
DFool 0.02 26.3 86.3 90.3
JSMA 0.02 25.5 91.5 97.0
LBFGS 0.02 12.1 88.0 91.6
C&W 0.04 04.8 92.7 98.0
VGG-19, original classification 71%
Clean 0.00 100 99.8 99.8
FGSM 0.05 12.2 79.3 81.3
IGSM 0.04 9.79 79.2 81.6
DFool 0.01 23.7 83.9 91.6
JSMA 0.01 29.1 95.8 98.5
LBFGS 0.03 13.8 83.0 93.9
C&W 0.04 0.00 93.1 97.6
Inception-v3, original classification 78%
Clean 0.00 100 98.1 98.5
FGSM 0.05 22.1 85.8 87.1
IGSM 0.04 15.5 89.7 89.1
DFool 0.02 27.2 82.6 85.3
JSMA 0.02 24.2 93.7 98.6
LBFGS 0.02 12.5 87.1 91.0
C&W 0.04 07.1 93.9 98.5
Table 3: Params: σ = 0.04, Window=10, Deflections=100
Top-1 accuracy on applying pixel deflection and wavelet de-
noising across various attack models.
2https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/slim#Pretrained
10.2. Comparison of results
- There are two main challenges when seeking to com-
pare defense models. First, many attack and defense tech-
niques primarily work on smaller images, such as those
from CIFAR and MNIST. The few proposed transfor-
mation based defense techniques which work on larger-
scale images are extremely recent, and currently under re-
view [48, 19]. Second, because different authors target
both different |LP | norms and different perturbation mag-
nitudes, it is difficult to balance the strength of various at-
tacks. We achieved 98% recovery on C&W with |L2| of
0.04 on ResNet-50, where Xie et al. [48] reports 97.1%
on ResNet-101 and 98.8% on ens-adv-Inception-ResNet-
v2. ResNet-101 is as stronger classifier than ResNet-50 and
ens-adv-Inception-Resnet-v2 [46] is an ensemble of clas-
sifiers specifically trained with adversarial augmentation.
They do not report the |L2| norm of the adversarial per-
turbations, and predictions are made on an ensemble of 21
crops. Guo et al. [19] have reported (normalized) accuracy
of 92.1% on C&W with |L2| of 0.06, and their predictions
are on an ensemble of 10 crops.
To present a fair comparison across various defenses we
only measure the fraction of images which are no longer
misclassified after the transformation. This ratio is known
as Destruction Rate and was originally proposed in [24].
Value of 1 means all the misclassified images due to the
adversary are correctly classified after the transformation.
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Figure 6: Left: Rank of adversarial class within the top-
5 predictions for original images. Right: Rank of original
class within the top-5 predictions for adversarial images. In
both cases, 0 means the class was not in the top-5.
As seen in Figure 6, the predicted class of the perturbed
image is very frequently among the classifier’s top-5 predic-
tions for the original image. In fact, nearly 40% of the time,
the adversarial class was the second most-probable class of
the original image. Similarly, the original classification will
often remain in the top-5 predictions for the adversarial im-
age. Unlike Kurakin et al. [24], our results are in terms of
top-1 accuracy, as this matches the objective of the attacker.
While top-1 accuracy is a more lenient metric for an attack
method (due to the availability of nearly-synonymous al-
ternatives to most classes in ImageNet-1000), it is a more
difficult metric for a defense, as we must exactly recover
Defense FGSM IGSM DFool C&W
Feature Squeezing (Xu et al [49])
(a) Bit Depth (2 bit) 0.132 0.511 0.286 0.170
(b) Bit Depth (5 bit) 0.057 0.022 0.310 0.957
(c) Median Smoothing (2x2) 0.358 0.422 0.714 0.894
(d) Median Smoothing (3x3) 0.264 0.444 0.500 0.723
(e) Non-local Mean (11-3-2) 0.113 0.156 0.357 0.936
(f) Non-local Mean (13-3-4) 0.226 0.444 0.548 0.936
Best model (b) + (c) + (f) 0.434 0.644 0.786 0.915
Random resizing + padding (Xie et al. [48] )
Pixel padding 0.050 - 0.972 0.698
Pixel resizing 0.360 - 0.974 0.971
Padding + Resizing 0.478 - 0.983 0.969
Quilting + TVM (Guo et al. [19] )
Quilting 0.611 0.862 0.858 0.843
TVM + Quilting 0.619 0.866 0.866 0.841
Cropping + TVM + Quilting 0.629 0.882 0.883 0.859
Our work: PD - Pixel Deflection, R-CAM: Robust CAM
PD 0.735 0.880 0.914 0.931
PD + R-CAM 0.746 0.912 0.911 0.952
PD + R-CAM + DCT 0.737 0.906 0.874 0.930
PD + R-CAM + DWT 0.769 0.927 0.948 0.981
Table 4: Destruction Rate of various defense techniques.
|L2| lies between 0.02−0.06 and classifier accuracy is 76%.
We only include the Black-box attacks, where the attack
model is not aware of the defense techniques. Single Pattern
Attack and Ensemble pattern attack as reported in Xie et al
[48] are not reported.
the correct classification. These facts render top-5 accuracy
an unsuitable metric for measuring the efficacy of a defense.
Results reported for Carlini & Wagner [6] attacks are only
for L2 loss, even though they can be applied for L0 and
L∞. Carlini & Wagner attack has been shown to be effec-
tive with MNIST and CIFAR but their efficacy against large
images is limited due to expensive computation.
10.3. Ablation studies
Previous work [24, 14] has demonstrated the efficacy of
JPEG compression as a defense against adversarial attacks
due to its denoising properties. Das et al. [9] demonstrate
that increasing the severity of JPEG compression defeats a
larger percentage of attacks, but at the cost of accuracy on
clean image. As our method employs a conceptually simi-
lar method to reduce adversarial noise via thresholding in a
wavelet domain, we use JPEG as a baseline for comparison.
In Table 5, we report accuracy with and without wavelet de-
noising with soft thresholding. While JPEG alone is effec-
tive against only a few attacks, the combination of JPEG
and pixel deflection performs better than pixel deflection
alone. The best results are obtained from pixel deflection
and wavelet denoising. Adding JPEG on top of these leads
to a drop in performance.
Model JPG WD PD PDJPG
WD
PD
JPG
WD
PD
Clean 96.1 98.7 97.4 96.1 96.1 98.9
FGSM 49.1 40.6 79.7 81.1 78.8 81.5
IGSM 49.1 31.2 82.4 82.4 79.7 83.7
DFool 67.8 61.1 86.3 86.3 86.3 90.3
JSMA 91.6 89.1 95.7 93.0 93.0 97.0
LBFGS 71.8 67.2 90.3 89.1 88.9 91.6
C&W 85.5 95.4 95.4 94.1 93.4 98.0
Table 5: Params: σ = 0.04, Window=10, Deflections=100
Ablation study of pixel deflection (PD) in combination with
wavelet denoising (WD) and JPEG compression.
Model Hard VISU SURE Bayes
Clean 39.5 96.1 92.1 98.9
FGSM 35.9 63.8 79.7 81.5
IGSM 42.5 67.8 81.1 83.7
DFool 37.2 78.4 87.7 90.3
JSMA 39.9 93.0 93.0 97.0
LBFGS 37.2 81.1 90.4 91.6
C&W 36.8 93.4 92.8 98.0
Table 6: Params: σ = 0.04, Window=10, Deflections=100
Comparison of various thresholding techniques, after appli-
cation of pixel deflection.
In Table 6 we present a comparison of various shrinkage
methods on wavelet coefficients after pixel deflection. For
the impact of coefficient thresholding in the absence of pixel
deflection, see Table 5. BayesShrink, which learns sepa-
rate Gaussian parameters for each coefficient, does better
than other soft-thresholding techniques. A brief overview
of these shrinkage techniques are provided in Section 7.2,
for more thorough review on BayesShrink, VisuShrink and
SUREShrink we refer the reader to [7] [13] and [12] re-
spectively. VisuShrink is a faster technique as it uses a uni-
versal threshold but that limits its applicability on some im-
ages. SUREShrink has been shown to perform well with
compression but as evident, in our results, it is less well
suited to denoising.
Attack |L2 No Defense With Defense
Window=10, Deflections −→ 10 100 1K 10K
Clean 0.00 100 98.4 98.1 94.7 80.3
FGSM 0.04 19.2 75.7 79.7 71.7 69.1
IGSM 0.03 13.8 78.4 81.7 75.2 71.2
DFool 0.02 25.0 83.7 87.7 81.0 77.0
JSMA 0.02 25.9 91.7 93.0 87.7 67.7
LBFGS 0.02 11.6 85.0 90.3 82.4 73.0
C&W 0.04 05.2 89.4 93.1 86.8 69.7
Table 7: Top-1 accuracy with different deflections.
Attack L2 No Defense With Defense
Deflections=100, Window −→ 5 10 50 100
Clean 0.00 100 98.6 98.1 96.4 94.4
FGSM 0.04 19.2 79.7 79.7 78.4 76.7
IGSM 0.03 13.8 81.0 81.7 79.7 78.4
DFool 0.02 25.0 86.4 87.7 87.7 85.0
JSMA 0.02 25.9 92.3 93.0 91.7 90.3
LBFGS 0.02 11.6 89.4 90.3 89.0 88.1
C&W 0.04 05.2 91.8 93.1 90.5 89.2
Table 8: Top-1 accuracy with different window sizes.
Sampling technique (Random Pixel)
Window −→ 5 10 50 100
Uniform 86.7 87.5 86.1 84.6
Gaussian 80.0 81.4 79.0 76.4
Replacement technique (Uniform Sampling)
Window −→ 5 10 50 100
Min 73.0 64.4 49.1 44.3
Max 69.7 63.8 51.9 45.4
Mean 83.6 72.3 57.2 49.1
Random 86.7 87.5 86.1 84.6
Various Denoising Techniques
Bilateral Anisotropic TVM Deconv Wavelet
78.1 84.1 77.26 85.12 87.5
Table 9: Top-1 accuracy averaged across all six attacks.
11. Conclusion
Motivated by the robustness of CNNs and the fragility
of adversarial attacks, we have presented a technique
which combines a computationally-efficient image trans-
form, pixel deflection, with soft wavelet denoising. This
combination provides an effective defense against state-
of-the-art adversarial attacks. We show that most attacks
are agnostic to semantic content, and using pixel deflection
with probability inversely proportionate to robust activation
maps (R-CAM) protects regions of interest. In ongoing
work, we seek to improve our technique by adapting hyper-
parameters based on the features of individual images. Ad-
ditionally, we seek to integrate our robust activation maps
with wavelet denoising.
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Figure 7: Comparison of Class activation maps and Robust Activation maps
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